When a Soldier Breaks the Law by Monroe, David Geeting
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 33 | Issue 3 Article 2
1942
When a Soldier Breaks the Law
David Geeting Monroe
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
David Geeting Monroe, When a Soldier Breaks the Law, 33 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 245 (1942-1943)
WHEN A SOLDIER BREAKS THE LAW
David Geeling Monroe'
The establishment of constitutional limitations governing the
military represents one of the notable contributions of the English
speaking peoples. Their known hostility to an unfettered military
rule and their defense of the rights of man find particular expression
in the development of procedures whereby the soldier who breaks
the law may be justly punished.
The soldier in the United States occupies a paradoxical as well
as unique position. On the one hand, entry into the armed services
of the United States is not considered merely as a contract but as a
change in status which insures the submission of the soldier to the
authoritative control of the Congress, the President, and the laws
and customs of the army. Such a conception is dominant for the
dual purpose of regimenting the soldiery to that strict discipline
essential to effective functioning of the army and to sustain the
supremacy of the Federal government in matters military. On the
other hand, under our constitutional form of government the citizen
on entering the army does not, nor cannot, shed his obligations and
responsibilities as a citizen. He is subject to all the liabilities of an
ordinary citizen when violating the civil (as opposed to military)
law. Equally important, he is at the same time assured of those
fundamental securities of life and liberty which symbolize the
democratic process. Thus, when the soldier breaks the law intricate
and interesting problems arise with respect to the jurisdictions
empowered to discipline him and the penalties which may be im-
posed.
The genesis of disciplinary control over the military is to be
found during the Revolutionary War period. Articles of war were
prepared by the Continental Congress at the outbreak of that war
and much attention was directed to the problem of control in the
constitutional convention of 1787. In consequence two embracive
provisions were incorporated in the constitution: The Congress
shall have power to make rules and regulations of the land and
naval forces and to provide for the governing of such part of the
militia as may be employed in the services of the United States.
2
By virtue of these broad authorities conferred3 the Congress in 1806
1 Director of Research and Information, Northwestern University Traffic
Institute, Evanston, Ill., Associate Editor of this JOURNAL.
2 Article 1, Sec. VIII.
3 Respecting the powers granted to the National government to raise and
support armies and to provide for the government and regulation thereof, the
court in Tarble's case (13 Wall. 397) (1871) said: "This execution of these
powers falls within the line of its duties; and its control over the subject is
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provided a complete statutory code of laws governing the relations
of members of the armed forces and their conduct as affecting the
good of the service. With some modifications the articles of war
of 1806 remained the basic law governing the United States mili-
tary for 110 years. Comprehensive revisions of the Articles oc-
curred in 1916 and again in 1920. The Articles of War (1920)
with some chdnges subsequently made constitute the base upon
which members of the land forces are governed.4
Persons subject to federal military law.
At the outset it is advisable to point out what persons are subject
to federal military law since one of the fundamental tests of court-
martial jurisdiction relates to the person of the accused. 5 Included
are the "military" personnel, that is soldiers belonging to the regular
army of the United States, volunteers from the date of their muster
or acceptance into the military service, all other persons lawfully
called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty, or for training in the
service,6 cadets, and soldiers of the marine corps when detached for
service with the armies of the United States. Military control like-
wise extends to all persons under sentence adjudged by courts-
martial and military personnel retired from the service.7 In addi-
tion, certain persons engaged in a quasi-military or in a civilian
capacity come within the jurisdiction of military law. Among these
are included officers and members of the army nurses corps, warrant
officers, army field clerks and other persons accompanying or serv-
plenary and exclusive. It can determine, without question from any State
authority, how the armies shall be raised, whether by voluntary enlistment or
forced draft, the age at which a soldier shall be received, and the period for
which he shall be taken ... And it can provide the rules for the government
and regulation of the forces after they are raised, define what shall constitute
military offenses, and prescribe their punishment. No interference with the
execution of this power of the National government in the formation, organiza-
tion, and government of its armies by any State officials could be permitted
without greatly impairing the efficiency, if it did not utterly destroy, this branch
of the public service."
4The Articles of War will be found in Appendix 1 of A. Arthur Schiller's
Military Law and Defense Legislation. (1941).
5 In this study no reference will be made to persons outside the military
service as, for example, spies, prisoners of war.
6 Note that under section 11 of the Selcetive Training and Service Act (1940)
no person shall be tried by any military or naval court-martial in any case
arising under that act unless such person has been actually inducted for the
training and service prescribed under the act or unless he is subject to trial
by court-martial under laws in force prior to the enactment of that act. 54
Stat. 885. Under the Articles of War (article 2) persons are subject to military
law from the date they are required to serve for duty or training as prescribed
by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same. Both acts will be
found in the appendix of A. Arthur Schiller's Military Law and Defense Legisla-
tion.
7 The case of Closson v. United States ex rel. Armes (7 App. D. C., 460)
(1896) affirms jurisdiction of courts-martial over retired army personnel: "A
retired army officer is subject to arrest and detention for court martial for an
offense against the articles of war."
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ing the army." But it should be remembered that military rule does
not extend beyond that conveyed by statute and consequently may
not assume jurisdiction over persons not in the military service,
either as a matter of convenience or public policy.9
As to the militia of the several states, federal military rule is
by no means exclusive. As Judge Story pointed out many years ago,
a free people are naturally jealous of the exercise of military power
and the power to call the militia into active service is certainly felt
to be one of no ordinary magnitude.'0 By virtue of their sovereignty,
the states reserve the right to discipline their militiamen and not
until they are employed in the services of the United States for the
enumerated purposes of suppressing insurrection, repelling invasion
and executing the laws of the United States do they become subject
to federal military rule. Ordinarily, employment is not deemed to
commence until arrival of the militia at the place of rendezvous
after presidential call. Until that time disciplinary action is within
the exclusive province of the respective states."'
Offenses punishable under federal military law
Offenses punishable under federal military law range from
minor infractions of military discipline to those of the most serious
nature, the penalty of which is death. Any act which tends to bring
disgrace or reproach upon the military service subjects the violator
to the penalties of military law. Nor are these acts restricted to
those done in the performance of military duties. Acts arising from
social relations, from private enterprise, or in a civil position subject
the person to military discipline.1 2 In the words of article 12 of
s Note, however, that retainers and camp personnel when within the juris-
diction of the United States in times of peace are not subject to military law.
Military Laws of the United States, prepared in the office of the Judge Advocate
General (8th Edition, 1939) sec. 359.
9Ex parte Wilson, 33 Fed. (2nd) 214 (1929).
10 Houston -v. Moore, 5 Wheat 1 (1820).
11 Said Judge Scott in Dunne v. People (94 Ill. 120) (1879): "The power of
State governments to legislate concerning the militia, existed and was exercised
before the adoption of the constitution of the United States, and as its exercise
was not prohibited by that instrument, it is understood to remain with the
States, subject only to the paramount authority of acts of Congress enacted
in pursuance of the constitution of the United States. The section of the con-
stitution ... does not confer on Congress unlimited power over the militia of
the States. It is restricted to specific objects enumerated, and for all other
purposes the militia remain as before the formation of the constitution, subject
to State authorities .... And no reason exists why a State may not control
its own militia within constitutional limitations. Its exercise by the States is
simply a means of self-protection."
12 Lt. Col. W. Winthrop in his volume Military Law (1886) relates: "...while
the act charged will more usually have been committed in a military capacity,
or have grown out of some military status or relation, it is by no means essential
that this should have been its history. It may equally well have originated in
some private transaction of the party, (as a member of civil society or as
a man of business) which, while impeaching his personal honor, has involved
such notoriety or publicity, or led such just complaint to superior military
authority, as to have seriously compromised his character and position as an
officer of the army and brought scandal or reproach upon the service." p. 1023.
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the articles of war:
"General courts-martial shall have power to try any person subject to mili-
tary law for any crime or offense made punishable by these articles, and any
other person who by the law of war is subject to trial by military tribunals."'
13
Two important exceptions should be noted however: in times
of peace no person shall be tried by court-martial for murder or for
rape committed within the geographic limits of the United States.14
If the offense charged is punishable under the articles of war and if
the person charged is "subject to military law" he is triable under
federal military law.
Concurrent jurisdiction in times of peace
It is a cardinal principle of American jurisprudence that the
government of the United States and that of the several states are,
within their respectives spheres of action, separate and distinct
sovereigns. Each may provide for the punishment of offenses
against its laws. Neither can, by merely providing for the punish-
ment of offenders against its laws, deprive others of the right to
punish offenders against their laws. Where a soldier violates the
military law of the United States and that of a state as well, the
offender is punishable both as a citizen subject to the laws of the
state wherein the offense was committed and also as a soldier subject
to military law.15
In times of peace certain well-defined policies are pursued with
respect to the apprehension and prosecution of a violator. The
articles of war require that upon application by civil authorities
military officers shall use their utmost endeavor to deliver over the
13 Listed among the offenses cognizable under military law in the articles
of war are the following: fraudulent enlistment, making a false muster, making
a false return to the War Department concerning personnel, equipment, and
the like, desertion, advising or aiding another to desert, entertaining a deserter,
absence without leave, disrespect toward a superior officer and government
officials, insubordinate conduct, mutiny or desertion, participating in quarrels,
frays and disorders, misbehavior before the enemy, subordinates compelling a
commander to surrender, improper use of countersign, neglecting to secure
property captured from the enemy, aiding or corresponding with the enemy,
spying, willful neglect, loss or wrongful disposition of government property,
drunkenness on duty, misbehavior by a sentinel, intimidation of persons bring-
ing supplies to the service, non-maintenance of good order, making provoking
speeches and gestures, dueling, murder, committing murder, rape,
manslaughter, mayhem, arson, burglary, housebreaking, robbery, embezzlement,
perjury, forgery, sodomy, assault with intent to commit a felony or to do
bodily harm, or assault with a deadly weapon, making or causing fraudulent
claims against the government, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentlemen,
leaving the service except in the manner permitted by law, and so on.
14 Article 92, Articles of War (1920).
15 One of the interesting cases to the point is State v. Rankin, 4 Cold. (Tenn.)
145 (1867). And as Judge Gilbert commented in Neall v. United States,
118 Fed. 699 (1902): "Forcible reasons may be suggested why courts-martial
should be given exclusive jurisdiction of all offenses which are punishable
under the articles of war, but we are not convinced that either in the constitu-
tion or in the acts of congress the intention has been expressed to except from
the jurisdiction of the civil courts offenses committed by any persons or class of
persons . .
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accused person or to aid officers of justice in apprehending and
securing the violator in order that he may be brought to trial.18
But no delivery need be made of a person who is held by military
authorities to answer, or who is awaiting trial or result of trial,
or is undergoing sentence for a crime or offense punishable under
the articles of war. Again, while civil courts may inquire by proceed-
ings in habeas corpus by what authority the accused is held, such
courts can proceed no further when apprised that the accused is
properly under custody of the United States.17 Finally there is the
principle that if civil authorities do not take the proper steps to
prosecute the offender, then it becomes the clear duty of the military
to bring the offender to justice under military jurisdiction.18
These procedures call to mind the significant remark of Judge
Brown made years ago to the effect that it was not the intention of
the constitution or the Congress to abdicate that supremacy of the
civil power which is a fundamental principle of the Anglo-Saxon
polity. 9 Certainly in times of peace, the principle of comity now
extent between the civil and the military authorities indicates that
civil authorities shall be principal actors in the arrest of persons
military who violate the civil law.
Jurisdiction in times of war and crisis
The principle that in times of war the rights of the individual
must yield to those of the state is as old as the common law. On
declaration of war the army's sphere of influence over its soldiery
automatically enlarges. As Garrard Glenn has descriptively re-
marked:
"The war powers of the executive, the wider scope of permissible legisla-
tion given Congress, may properly reach far beyond the landmarks which
the Constitution fixes for our journey through the days of peace.
'2 0
The exclusiveness of federal military control over members of the
armed forces is to be found in the seventy-fourth article of war
which provides that except in times of war the commanding officer
is required to use his utmost endeavor to delivery over the accused
to civil authorities. From this issues the fact that in time of war
the military is under no obligation to turn over the offender to civil
authorities. As a tactical matter, however, military authorities
have pursued a "middle of the road" policy. If the offense against
16 Article 74, Article of War (1920). In construing this provision a Judge
Advocate General stated: "... in the absence of special or peculiar circum-
stances warranting an opinion that the soldier might be deprived of a fair
and impartial trial by the civil authorities, insistence upon military juris-
diction should be waived and the soldier surrendered to the civil authorities
for trial, upon proper demand in due form." Digest of Opinions of the Judge
Advocate General of the Army, (1912-1930) (1932), 1430.5.
17 For further discussion see pp. 252-253.
18 Garrard Glenn, The Army and the Law (1918), p. 60.
19 United States v. Clark, 31 Fed. 710 (1887).
20 Garrard Glenn, The Army and the Law (1918), p. 142.
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the civil community is of such seriousness as to "serve to dis-
qualify the offender for military service and association with up-
right and honorable men," as a judge advocate general opinioned,
the offender will then be turned over to civil authorities.
21
With respect to times of martial law, the same principle ap-
plicable to war times likewise applies. In the words of Judge
Mitchell:
" ... while the military are in active service for the suppression of disorder
and violence, their rights and obligations as soldiers must be judged by the
standard of actual war. No other standard is possible, for the first and
overruling duty is to repress disorder, whatever the cost, and all means which
are necesary to that end are-lawful."2
2
Resort to the military arm of the government to preserve in-
ternal order requires that the sphere of influence of civil officials
be subordinated and that the rule of force under military- processes
becomes the governing consideration. Martial law, as the offspring
of necessity, transcends the ordinary course of civil law.
Location of the offense as a jurisdictional factor
Place where the violation occurs is always a vital factor in fixing
the respective jurisdictions of military and civil authorities. Civil
authority does not reach into areas over which the Congress is
granted the exclusive right to legislate by the constitution. Areas
listed are those purchased for the erection of forts, magazines,
arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings.2 3 Where offenses
of a civil nature (except murder and rape) are committed within
such areas, the federal military retain complete jurisdiction over the
offense. Contrarily, where the offense occurs outside of listed areas
primary jurisdiction lies with civil authorities although both mili-
tary and civil authorities have concurrent jurisdiction over the
offense. 24 The rule of priority is frequently followed: this provides
that the authority whose jurisdiction first attaches by reason of
arrest or process retains jurisdiction until the case has been com-
pletely satisfied.
The many considerations which govern when a soldier breaks
the law illustrate why civil and military authorities must establish
and maintain the closest cooperation with one another. Otherwise
conflict of interest can easily arise. Nature of the offense, whereit
was committed, whether occurrence was in time of war, during
martial law, or in times of peace are all contributing factors. In
the final analysis there is no general rule to fit all cases. Matters
of public opinion, the character of local tribunals, adequacy of jail
21 See the Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the Army
(1912-1930) (1932), 1431.
22 Commonwealth ex rel Wadsworth v. Shorthall, 206 Pa. 165 (1903).
23 Article 1, sec. VIII.
24EX parte McRoberts, 16 Iowa 600 (1864).
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facilities, temper of the times, and many other factors must like-
wise guide. If, in every locality civil and military authorities join
hands in the control of this all important problem, a minimum of
conflict could not but result.
2 5
A final consideration remains: wherein lies jurisdiction over the
soldier where an offense is committed in foreign lands? Jurisdiction
of federal military authorities becomes exclusive the moment the
army leaves our national boundaries. While marching through
friendly lands or stationed within them, the soldiery is generally
exempted from the civil or criminal jurisdiction of the place. The
consent of the friendly government to such a proposition is assumed
as a matter of course or is arranged by international agreement:
"The grant of a free passage.., implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over the
troops during their passage, and permits the foreign general to use that
discipline and to inflict those punishments which the government of this army
may require." 26
Likewise, where the army invades an enemy's country, the civil
law of the invaded country can have no part in the disciplinary
process. The law of war ranks supreme and constitutes the only
guide for action.
27
Disciplinary action by military authorities
A variety of agencies have been provided through which military
jurisdiction is expressed. Courts of inquiry are provided for the
examination of accusations and transactions against army person-
nel. Summary military commissions and provost marshal courts
are available for a variety of purposes. Disciplinary action is
accorded commanding officers. And comprehensive provision is
made for disciplinary action through courts-martial.
Although broad authorities are conferred upon commanding
officers for the discipline of persons under their command, the
articles of war prescribe a number of limitations on these discipli-
nary authorities. Without intervention of court-martial (unless
the accused demands trial by such court) the commanding officer
of any detachment, company, or higher command may, for minor
offenses, impose such disciplinary action on persons of his com-
25 For an interesting discussion of the problem see the monograph of the
American Municipal Association, "When a Soldier Breaks the Law," (1941)
pp. 8-17.
26 Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509 (1878) ; The Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon and Others, 7 Cranch. 139 (1812).
27 Said Justice Field in Dow v. Johnson: "There would be something singu-
larly absurd in permitting an officer or soldier of an invading army to be
tried by his enemy, whose country it had invaded. The same reasons for
his exemption from criminal prosecution apply to civil proceedings. There
would be as much incongruity, and as little likelihood of freedom from the
irritations of the war, in civil as in criminal proceedings prosecuted during its
continuance. In both instances, from the very nature of war, the tribunals of the
enemy must be without jurisdiction to sit in judgment upon the military con-
duct of the officers and soldiers of the invading army." 100 U. S. 158 (1879).
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mand as the following: admonition, reprimand, withholding of
privileges not to exceed one week, extra fatigue duty not to exceed
one week, and hard labor without confinement not to exceed one
week. Such punishment cannot include forfeiture of pay or con-
finement under guard. There is the proviso, however, that in times
of war or grave public emergency, a brigadier general or officer
of higher grade may impose upon an officer of his command below
the grade of major a forfeiture of pay of not more than one-half of
the accused's salary for one month.28 But if any person subject to
military law is charged with crime or with a serious offense under
the articles of war, he must be placed in confinement or in arrest
as the circumstances may require.29 But no arrest or confinement
may occur except on personal knowledge of, or after inquiry into,
the offense.3 0
Prerogatives of courts-martial
Courts-martial derive their validity from the authority of the
Congress to make rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces. The courts are entirely independent of the
judicial system as authorized in Article III of the Constitution and
for this reason guarantees as to trial by jury and presentment or
indictment by grand jury do not apply. 31 As the jurisdiction of
courts-martial is fundamentally statutory, they are not essentially
creatures of war and their jurisdiction to try offenses does not
depend upon the fact of war or peace.
Well-defined limitations exist with respect to issuance of habeas
corpus writs by civil courts relating to persons held in military
custody. While a civil court may, of course, issue such a writ for
purposes of ascertaining by what authority the accused is held,
once the civil tribunal is apprized that the person is under custody
of the United States the civil court can proceed no further.
"But after the return is made, and the State judge or court judicial apprized
that the party is in custody under the authority of the United States, they can
proceed no further. They then know that the person is within the domain and
jurisdiction of another Government, and that neither the writ of habeas corpus,
nor any other process issued under State authority, can pass over the line of
divisions between the two sovereignties."'
' 2
28 Article 104 of the Articles of War (1920).
29 Articles 42 and 69 of the Articles of War (1920).
30A Manual for Courts-Martial, U. S. Army (1928 ed. corrected) (1936),
secs. 19, 20.
31 Kahn et al. v. Anderson, 255 U. S. I (1920). In this case it was contended
that the Congress was without power to provide courts-martial inconsistently
with the guarantees as to trial by jury and presentment or indictment by
grand jury. Said Justice White: Such argument is without foundation "since
it directly denies the existence of a power in Congress exerted from the
beginning.... The constitutionality of the acts of Congress touching army and
navy courts martial in this country, if there could ever have been a doubt about
it, is no longer an open question in this court."32 Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506 (1858).
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In the conduct of trial and the verdict rendered by courts-martial
it is clear that civil courts cannot enter upon a consideration of the
evidence presented before the courts-martial, nor review errors
committed in admitting evidence to court, nor question the
procedural rules employed during trial, nor pass upon the severity
of the sentence imposed by courts-martial so long as the imposed
penalty is conformable to law.33 In these respects the jurisdiction
of a court-martial is exclusive and its supreme position is not
challengable so long as the court-martial is appointed by an official
empowered to appoint it, so long as membership of the court is in
accordance with law with respect to the number and competency of
members to sit on the court, and so long as the court is invested
by act of Congress with power to try the person and the offense
charged.
The limitations of courts-martial
Although courts-martial possess powers of strategic importance,
one has no fear that the shadows of the Gestapo will find reflection
here. The authority as well as the jurisdiction of courts-martial
is expressly circumscribed by the Congress and to that body and
to the citizenry the courts-martial owe their existence. Their juris-
diction is criminal only and they have no power to entertain civil
suits. Their authority extends only to the military personnel, not
to the citizenry at large.34 As courts of special and limited juris-
33 "It is not the office of a writ of habeas corpus to perform the functions
of a writ of error in reviewing the judgment of a court-martial. Courts-martial
are tribunals created by congress in pursuance of the power conferred by the
constitution, and have as plenary jurisdiction of offenses committed to them
by the law military as do the circuit and district courts of the United States
in the exercise of their statutory powers over other offenses. The question of
jurisdiction may be reached by such a writ; . .. but the range and scope of
the inquiry is controlled by the same rules and limitations in either case. There
must be Jurisdiction to hear and determine, and to render the particular judg-
ment or sentence imposed; but, if this exists, however erroneous the proceedings
may be, they cannot be reviewed collaterally, or redressed by habeas corpus."
Rose ex rel Carter v. Roberts, 99 Fed. 948 (1900). Again, the court in ex parte
Dickey, 204 Fed. 322 (1913) stated: " . . . the only question before the civil
c6urt is whether or not the military court has the right to try and determine
the cause; that the jurisdiction of the trial court cannot depend upon its
decision on the merits of the cause, but upon the court's right to hear and decide
it; that where a military or naval tribunal has the right to try the cause, even
though a civil court had the concurrent right, the civil court cannot enter upon
the consideration of the evidence adduced before the court-martial, or of the
question whether the accused was guilty of the offense over which the military
court has jurisdiction; that if the military court had jurisdiction to impose
sentence authorized by the regulations of the army and navy, the civil court
cannot pass upon the severity of such sentence; that errors in law, however
numerous, committed by the trial court in a cause within its jurisdiction, can
be reviewed only by appeal or writ of error in the court exercising supervisory
jurisdiction; that it is only where the trial court is without the jurisdiction
of the person or the cause, and the party is subjected to illegal imprisonment,
that a writ of habeas corpus may be invoked, and the party discharged from
imprisonment. Civil courts are not courts of error to review the proceedings
and sentence of a court martial .... "
34Except as to persons who by the law of war are subject to trial by military
tribunals.
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diction, they are called into existence only for a special purpose
and to perform a particular duty. When the object of their existence
has been accomplished they are dissolved. Their decisions are by
no means conclusive, merely advisory, and are subject to final
opinion by the army service. Channels of appeal are supplied which
may conclude in the presidential office wherein lies the power of
pardon.
Flogging, branding, marking, and other cruel and unusual
punishments are prohibited. Nor, except for desertion in time of
war, repeated desertion in time of peace, and mutiny, may a court-
martial punish, the accused by confinement in a penitentiary unless
the act or commission of which he is convicted is recognized as an
offense of a civil nature and is punishable by penitentiary con-
finement for more than one year by some statute of the United
States of general application within continental United States.
35
Finally, despite the apparently insulated position of courts-
martial and their independency of the civil judicial system, such
courts are always open to collateral attack by civil courts. As courts
of special and limited jurisdiction, courts-martial are viewed with
a critical eye by civil tribunals, as a long series of decisions in both
state and federal courts testifies. It should be remembered that the
jurisdiction of every court-martial and hence the validity of its
judgment is conditioned by five prerequisites each of which must
be satisfied: (1) It must be convened by an officer empowered by
statute to call it. (2) Officers commanded to sit upon it must be
of the status authorized by the Articles of War. (3) The court thus
constituted must be covered by an act of Congress with power to
try the person accused. (4) The offense charged must be within
-the list of offenses prescribed by the Congress. (5) The sentence
must be conformable to the law. Absence of any one of these in-
dispensable conditions renders the judgment and sentence "'coram
non-judice, and absolutely void," in the words of a court, "because
such a judgment and sentence is rendered without authority of law
and without jurisdiction.
'36
Thus are the prerogatives of the democratic tradition guarded
in the service military. Through the limitless channel of jurisdic-
tion the fundamental safeguards of life and liberty are perpetuated.
But within the broad authorities conferred upon the military in
terms of disciplinary action, the military are given that requirable
control over the soldiery without which the effective functioning
of the armed forces would be imperiled.
35 For exceptions see article 42 of the Articles of War (1920). Note also
limitations respecting confinement prescribed by articles 43-45.
386 Deming v. McClaughry, 113 Fed. 639 (1902).
